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Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
It is always fun, and a rare treat (for me, at least), to be at-
tacked from the right. Professor Gary Lawson has me down as a 
stark-raving moderate. According to Professor Lawson, my 
proposition-that Congress may abrogate the judicial doctrine 
of stare decisis in constitutional cases 1- is, absolutely sound as a 
matter of present doctrine(!)2 but wrong as a matter of the origi-
nal meaning of Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
(which Lawson calls the "Sweeping Clause," after founding-era 
practice rather than current shorthand). 
Professor Lawson's argument, in a nutshell, is as follows. 
Major premise: The Sweeping Clause precludes enactment of 
laws that are not "proper" for carrying into execution the powers 
of another department, including (and this is the key) laws that 
interfere with those departments' autonomous exercise of their 
enumerated functions, unless the Constitution specifically per-
mits it.3 Minor premise: "The judicial Power" of Article III in-
cludes "the power to reason to the outcome of a case. "4 Conclu-
sion: "Even if the courts are applying a wrongheaded, or even 
unconstitutionally wrongheaded, method of decision-making, 
the Sweeping Clause does not empower Congress to prescribe a 
different process. "5 
* Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Copyright 2000. 
I. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Re-
move the Precedential Effect of Roc and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000). 
2. Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial De-
cision-Making, 18 Cons!. Comm. 191, 200 (2001). ("Professor Paulsen devotes much of 
his analysis to a demonstration that his proposed precedent-restricting statute is consis-
tent with long-established doctrinal understandings about congressional power to regu-
late the judicial process. He is entirely right about this.") (emphasis added, footnote omit-
ted). 
3. Id. at 199. 
4. I d. at 210. 
5. Id. at 211. 
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Under Lawson's admirably relentless reasoning, Congress 
cannot "properly" pass a statute forbidding courts to decide 
cases on the basis of coin flips, or the color of litigants' skin, or 
on the basis of vote-swapping or vote-selling. Congress simply 
has no power to pass any laws that affect the process of judicial 
case-deciding, other than to prescribe (some) rules of proce-
dure.6 (This is an important concession, as we shall see.) 
This does not mean that courts can do whatever they want. 
It just means that the only constitutionally permitted remedies 
for outrageous or even unconstitutional misuses of the judicial 
power by the courts are, according to Lawson, (1) impeachment; 
and (2) executive refusal to enforce such decisions (in some cir-
cumstances). These are big sticks, and, judging from his other 
writings, Lawson apparently would wield them quite aggres-
sively: He thinks that stare decisis is unconstitutional,7 that the 
impeachment power is quite broad,8 and that the President right-
fully may refuse to execute clearly unconstitutional decisions of 
the judiciary.9 Putting these views together, it would seem to fol-
low that it is constitutionally "proper" (in Lawson's world) for 
Congress to impeach a judge who regularly follows prior prece-
dent rather than the original public meaning of the Constitu-
tion's text, where the conflict between precedent and original 
meaning is clear. Put starkly, Congress may impeach judges for 
following stare decisis to reach results that they otherwise would 
be persuaded are wrong on originalist premises. In addition, the 
executive legitimately may refuse to enforce wrong judicial deci-
sions that rely, wrongly, on stare decisis. 10 
6. I d. at 210, 224. 
7. Id. at 228-29. For Professor Lawson's argument that the doctrine of stare decisis 
is unconstitutional, sec Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23 (1994). Cf. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1548-49 n.38 (cited in 
note 1) (distilling this argument and collecting authorities). 
8. Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu· 
tiona/Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1309-13 (1996). 
9. Id. at 1324-26. 
10. I am not absolutely sure whether Lawson would find it legitimate to decline to 
enforce judicial judgments that rest on stare decisis, because he docs not explicitly say so. 
But this conclusion seems to follow from the clarity of the constitutional case against 
precedent, as sketched by Lawson (and Lawson generally can be counted on to follow his 
premises where they lead him): Professor Lawson's standard for "executive review" of 
judicial judgments is whether the President has "a very high degree of confidence" that 
they are unconstitutional. Lawson, 18 Canst. Comm. at 42 (cited in note 2). See also 
Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1324-26 (cited in note 8). And Professor Lawson 
has a very high degree of confidence that the doctrine of stare decisis is unconstitutional. 
See Lawson, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. at 24 (cited in note 7). A fully informed Lawson-
ian President therefore would seem authorized (if not obliged) to nullify judicial deci· 
sions that rely on stare decisis to reach results contrary to the original public meaning of 
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But nonetheless-now, let me get this straight, Gary-
Congress and the President cannot enact a statute purporting to 
oblige the judiciary to decide federal cases in conformity with 
these principles, the violation of which properly could subject 
the judges to impeachment and lead the executive to refuse to 
enforce the judgments thus rendered?! It is an unconstitutional 
intrusion on the province of the judiciary to pass a statute stating 
correct principles of constitutional law, but constitutional to hang 
the judges for departing from those principles? 
Professor Lawson is also forced by his view of the Sweeping 
Clause to conclude, quite cheerfully, that many congressional 
regulations of judicial practice, including standard-of-review 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, and the organic acts of many agencies, are 
all probably unconstitutional, the product of twentieth-century 
legislative adventurism.ll Also unconstitutional are Federalist-
era congressional usurpations like the Full Faith and Credit Act 
(1790) and the Anti-Injunction Act (1793). Only the Rules of 
Decision Act escapes the sweep of Lawson's sweepingly narrow 
view of the Sweeping Clause, but only because Lawson thinks it 
"an exhortation rather than a regulation," being merelf "de-
claratory" of what the Constitution requires in any event. 1 Thus 
it is that I have betrayed true principles of originalist constitu-
tional interpretation and fallen into the abyss of mere sound doc-
trinal exposition, by saying that Congress can abrogate stare de-
cisis: "Professor Paulsen has history, practice, and doctrine on 
his side. Indeed, he has everything except the Constitution. "13 
As usual, Professor Lawson's writing is brimming with bril-
liant insights. I suppose I should be satisfied with Lawson's con-
clusion that the legal world can reject my position that Congress 
may abrogate stare decisis by statute only by repudiating so 
much else it holds dear, and just leave it at that. With enemies 
like Lawson, who needs friends? 
the Constitution. 
(I actually agree with Lawson on all of these points-except, of course, for his weak-
kneed limitation of executive review to cases of "clear" judicial error. See Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83 
Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1357 n.67 (1999). My argument that Congress possesses power to 
abrogate stare decisis by statute does not, however, depend on these premises. I am en-
gaging Lawson here on his own premises.) 
II. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 223 (cited in note 2). 
12. Id. at 217. 
13. Id.at200. 
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But I'm greedy. I want more: I want the originalist-purists, 
too. And I think I should be able to get them, because this time 
I've got Lawson dead to rights: His two key concessions-first, 
the nuclear alternatives of impeachment and nonexecution as 
constitutionally legitimate checks on the courts; and second, the 
legitimacy (or at least harmlessness) of the Rules of Decision 
Act as a statute declaratory of what should be understood as the 
proper constitutional rule in any event-give away the whole 
ballgame. 
I. THE IMPEACHMENT AND NONEXECUTION 
CONCESSIONS 
I wish Lawson had said more about his wildly provocative, 
but eminently defensible, twin points that Congress may im-
peach federal judges for disregarding the Constitution in favor of 
erroneous judicial precedents, and that the President may disre-
gard judicial decisions that reflect such disregard, at least in 
fairly clear cases. But I will leave these points to the provo-
cateur, for present purposes. 14 
My point here is less sweeping (so to speak): Why could not 
a statute directing federal judges to apply the Constitution, stat-
utes, and treaties of the United States, rather than erroneous ju-
dicial interpretations of them, be thought "necessary and 
proper" for carrying into execution the impeachment and non-
execution powers of Congress and the President, respectively, by 
laying the groundwork, or predicate, for the exercise of these 
more drastic checks on an errant judiciary? Isn't it "proper" to 
fire a warning shot across the bow, before dropping The Big One 
on the judiciary? Isn't the judgment of the necessity for doing so 
pretty much committed to Congress, under the approach of 
McCulloch v. Maryland? 15 Isn't the message implicitly conveyed 
by a statute abrogating stare decisis that it is Congress's view that 
such a statute, not the judicial doctrine of stare decisis, marks the 
true path of judicial duty? Does such a message have to come 
coupled with an overt threat of impeachment in order to fall 
within Congress's constitutional power to legislate? 
Since more than a few readers might not accept the idea 
that stare decisis is actually unconstitutional, let me return to my 
!4. His arguments are laid out fairly extensively in Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. 
Rev. at 1311, 1324-29 (cited in note 8). You can look it up. 
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
2001) REPLY TO LAWSON 235 
more humble example: Congress passes a statute prohibiting 
coin-flips as a way of deciding judicial cases. If one prefers, 
make the hypothetical sharper by adding a provision declaring 
that deciding a case in such a manner may well be regarded by 
Congress as an impeachable offense. (Congress probably can't 
bind in advance, by statute, the separate judgments of the 
House, to impeach, and the Senate, to convict, for such an of-
fense, but just play along with the hypothetical for a moment.) 
Does the no-coin-flips statute exceed Congress's power under 
the Sweeping Clause? If not, what distinguishes a statute abro-
gating stare decisis? 16 
I can't think of a way for Lawson to wriggle out of this trap, 
but he's a clever guy, and I'd like to see him try. The short point 
is this: Once one concedes that some modes of judicial decision-
making are so out-of-bounds as to be grounds for executive non-
enforcement and even impeachment, then a law regulating or 
prohibiting such modes of judicial decisionmaking can readily be 
conceived as falling within the Sweeping Clause, as necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution these other powers for 
checking judicial violations of the Constitution. And if stare de-
cisis is thought to be one of those unconstitutional modes (as 
Lawson argues), then a law prohibiting it is likewise necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution these other powers. 
Thus, under my premise that stare decisis is not constitutionally 
required, Congress may abrogate the mere judicial policy of stare 
decisis. And under Lawson's premise that stare decisis is af-
firmatively unconstitutional, it is surely "proper" for Congress to 
enact a statute barring its use by the judiciary. 
II. THE RULES OF DECISION ACT CONCESSION 
Just about every congressional statute ever passed that 
regulates how cases are decided by courts is unconstitutional, 
16. Just as Congress could pass a statute barring coin flips, on the ground that it 
would regard such a process of judicial decision-making as quite possibly presenting an 
occasion for exercise of the impeachment power (notwithstanding that the process of de-
ciding cases is an exclusively judicial power), so too it could pass a statute banning the 
president from exercising one of his plenary powers in what Congress regards as an arbi-
trary or corrupt manner (such as, the granting of presidential pardons in return for cam-
paign contributions or silence in a criminal investigation of the president, to conjure ex-
amples of equally unimaginable misuse of constitutional prerogative). In either case, the 
act of Congress wouldn't preclude defiance by the other branches, but would fall within 
the scope of the Sweeping Clause power of Congress to enact laws "necessary and 
proper" for carrying into execution its impeachment power. 
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Lawson argues. 17 The Rules of Decision Aces survives, how-
ever, because it is "an exhortation rather than a regulation, along 
the lines of 'decide cases correctly' or 'observe National Vinegar 
Month."' 19 Such a declaration "does not change the legal land-
scape" and thus "does not implicate the principle of decisional 
independence."20 It is therefore not unconstitutional for Con-
gress to have passed such a purely declaratory law. 
I am far less convinced than Lawson that the Rules of Deci-
sion Act is merely declaratory. But I will again accept his prem-
ise for the sake of argument, in order to see where the argument 
leads. I think it leads to this principle: If instructions to courts as 
to how to go about deciding a class of cases are merely declara-
tory of correct constitutional principles that should apply in any 
event, it is not "improper" for Congress to embody such instruc-
tions in a declaratory statute. I take this to be what Lawson is 
saying in his no-harm-no-foul treatment of the Rules of Decision 
Act. If that is right, and if (as Lawson believes) stare decisis is 
unconstitutional, why is it beyond Congress's power to direct 
courts to apply the Constitution, rather than judicial interpreta-
tions thereof, in the event of a conflict between the two? Isn't 
such a statute a "choice of law" provision almost precisely 
analoRous to the Rules of Decision Act? Isn't it purely declara-
tory? 
This brings me back to Lawson's interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause. Can a law be "necessary and proper for carry-
ing into execution" the judicial Power if it directs the courts to 
do what the Constitution (rightly construed) directs the courts to 
do in any event? Yes-certainly yes, if a declaratory Rules of 
Decision Act is constitutional (and Lawson thinks it is).22 Such a 
17. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 211 (cited in note 2). 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution 
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.") 
19. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 223 (cited in note 2). 
20. !d. at 217. 
21. A different type of objection might be that a statute abrogating stare decisis 
would either be redundant (if Lawson's views on stare decisis are correct) or an unconsti-
tutional infringement on judicial autonomy (in any other case of a statute regulating the 
processes of judicial decisionmaking). But Lawson appears to have no problem with re-
dundancy. Declaratory statutes are just fine. !d. at 217 and n.94 (citing Agency Hol~ing 
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987) (Scaha, J., concurnng) 
(collecting early cases taking the view that the Rules of Decision Act is declaratory of 
what would be the proper rule in any event). 
22. !d. at 217. 
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statute is "proper" unless it interferes with decisional independ-
ence, and it does not interfere with decisional independence if it 
does not alter judicial obligation rightly construed. Whether it is 
"necessary" is a different question. But necessity is largely a 
matter of congressional judgment.23 
Surely Congress may judge declaratory statutes to be rea-
sonably calculated to assure the legitimate end of courts prop-
erly performing their constitutional tasks Sometimes courts 
need reminders of what should be obvious. Sometimes a point 
might not be so obvious after all. Sometimes it is good to clarify 
a point of possible misunderstanding, out of an abundance of 
caution.24 
In any event, Congress may deem it "proper" to express its 
view through enactment of a statute embodying that view. 
(Once again, doing so could be a first step appropriate to the ex-
ercise of more drastic powers, like impeachment.) If the view 
embodied in Congress's statute is wrong as a matter of the con-
stitutional question at hand, the courts of course are free (in-
deed, obligated) to disregard it. That, of course, is the holding of 
Marbury v. Madison. 25 In such a case, the statute is unconstitu-
tional not because any and all statutes declaring judicial obliga-
tion exceed Congress's power under the Sweeping Clause, but 
because this one is substantively unconstitutional. And con-
versely, if the view embodied in Congress's statute is not wrong, 
it does not violate the Constitution for Congress to enact it in the 
form of a declaratory statute, if Congress thinks it useful to pro-
moting a constitutionally legitimate end to do so. 
So, with all due respect to Professor Lawson (and much re-
spect is due), I must quibble with his conclusion that, since 
23. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-14. Actually, Professor Lawson might 
dispute this, too. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 199 n.37 ("All of the relevant inquiries 
under the sweeping clause are objective; the Constitution does not commit interpretation 
of the sweeping clause exclusively to Congress."). I am not prepared to dispute his dis-
putation here, and perhaps we do not disagree at all, if I cast the point in more precisely 
Lawsonian lingo: The Constitution does not supply a rule of law that would justify judi-
cial invalidation of Congress's judgment, within broad bounds, of the necessity of a par-
ticular measure for carrying into execution a power of Congress or another Department. 
24. Thus the Latin legal maxim, ex abundanti cautela. See Fort Stewart Schools v. 
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641,646 (1990). 
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Not that anybody (except Gary Lawson!) 
thinks it necessary, but I have defended the correctness of Marbury's reasoning, as an 
original matter, in other writings. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L.J. 217, 228-62 (1994). See 
Lawson, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. at 26, n.12 (cited in note 7) (emphasizing that his citing 
of Marbury is for its persuasive value only). 
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" [ t ]his declaratory role was understood in the founding era ... 
the Rules of Decision Act therefore does not reflect any 
underlying theory of the sweeping clause."26 Huh? Sure it does: 
The fact that such a declaratory statute would have been widely 
understood as not improper means that congressional statutes 
declaratory of constitutionally proper rules of judicial decision-
making are within the power of Congress to enact. The Rules of 
Decision Act demonstrates that the Sweeping Clause permits 
Congress to enact statutes that declare and enforce correct con-
stitutional rules, including rules that touch on the exercise of the 
judicial office. And if that principle is correct, Lawson should 
have no problem with a statute declaring that judges should not 
apply what Lawson believes is the unconstitutional doctrine of 
stare decisis. 
My original argument was a bit narrower: that, whether or 
not the doctrine of stare decisis is unconstitutional, it is at least 
not constitutionally required, and is thus a matter of mere judicial 
policy that Congress has authority to alter by statute.Z7 But if 
Lawson is right in saying that the practice of stare decisis is not 
only constitutionally unnecessary, but constitutionally improper, 
then the case for the validity of a statute abrogating stare decisis 
is all the stronger. And if he is right in saying that the Constitu-
tion permits impeachment and nonenforcement as remedies for 
clearly wrong judicial decisions, then the case for the validity of a 
mere statute seems all the stronger yet. In short, Lawson's 
premises, if accepted, only strengthen my argument, at every 
point (in addition to making it seem "moderate" by compari-
son). 
III. WHY, GARY, WHY? 
Why does Awesome Lawson, whose infidelity to conven-
tional constitutional wisdom is otherwise so impressive, worship 
at the idol of judicial autonomy to employ even "unconstitution-
ally wrong"28 methods of constitutional decision-making, at least 
as far as Congress's power to do anything about it through legis-
lation passed pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
concerned? Why does Lawson, whose formalism is otherwise so 
relentless, become the most fuzzy-wuzzy of functionalist-
pragmatist-balancers (if I may be so insulting) when he says that 
26. Lawson, 18 Const. Cornrn. at 217, n.94 (cited in note 2). 
27. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1543 (cited in note 1). 
28. Lawson, 18 Const. Cornrn. at 194-95 (cited in note 2) (emphasis deleted). 
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"circularity is common, and unavoidable, in many separation-of-
powers contexts"?29 I barely recognize the Pharaoh of Formal-
ism when he concedes, in a string of situations, that "one cannot 
avoid the exercise of judgment based on shades and degrees. "30 
Shades and degrees?! Under Lawson's fuzzy Constitution, 
the "nondelegation doctrine" forbids the delegation by Congress 
of policy decisions that are important enough that Congress 
should make them.31 An "officer" or "principal officer" under 
Article II is someone whose responsibilities are important 
enough to deserve such a label.32 Whether procedural rules "slip 
into substantive regulations of judicial decision-making ... must 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they 
unduly regulate the decision-making process."33 Whether a stat-
ute interferes with executive power depends on whether it "un-
duly interfere[s]" with executive power. And adjudication of 
substantive due process claims calls on courts "to exercise that 
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: 
reasoned judgment." 
Okay, Lawson did not actually say these last two. I made 
them up, just to be mean. Only the Supreme Court possibly 
could say such things and really mean them.34 But the logic of 
Lawson's "proper" -means-in-accord-with-background-understand-
ings-of-separation-of-powers-and-federalism-and-individual-rights 
reading of the Sweeping Clause does-as he comes dangerously 
close to conceding-tend to create a free-float of "constitutional 
values" for deciding cases.35 It is hard to distinguish such a 
"springboard" methodology from that which liberal-activist 
judges have used with the Due Process Clause. Say it ain't so, 
Gary! 
I submit that the "proper" approach to separation-of-
powers questions is to ascertain whether the text of the Constitu-
tion supplies a rule, either through a specific provision or as a 
necessary deduction from its structural arrangements, that in-
validates a particular political choice or that commits that choice 
29. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 225 (cited in note 2). 
30. Id. 
31. ld. 
32. ld. 
33. Id. (emphasis added). 
34. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,693-696 (1988); Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
35. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 199 (cited in note 2). For a more detailed criticism 
of this methodology, as applied to separation-of-powers questions, sec Paulsen, 109 Yale 
L.J. at 1580-82 & n.121 (cited in note 1). 
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to a different decisionmaker, and then to apply the logic of such 
rule rigorously and relentlessly. This is what I would have 
thought my sometime hero, Gary Lawson, would do. A true 
Lawsonian formalist would find an independent counsel statute 
(or independent agencies) unconstitutional, not because they in-
terfere "too much" with executive power, but because the power 
violates the clear constitutional text that the executive power is 
to be vested solely in "a President" and because law-execution is 
almost incontestably an executive power.36 A true Lawsonian 
formalist would find that there isn't any "nondelegation doc-
trine" in the Constitution because the document contains no rule 
that states how specific Congress's policy determinations need 
be and how much may be left to execution by the Article II 
branch.37 A true Lawsonian formalist would conclude that the 
Constitution fails to state a rule concerning what is required for 
"officer" or "principal officer" status, leaving Congress lots of 
room to decide these things as it thinks best. And a true Law-
sonian formalist would conclude that there is no line distinguish-
ing Congress's power to regulate matters of judicial "procedure" 
from power concerning "decision-making methodology," but 
only a sweeping power of Congress to enact laws for carrying 
into execution the judicial power. 
The answers to separation-of-powers questions do not call 
for "the exercise of judgment based on shades and degrees." 
They call for the principled derivation of sound categories and 
for categorical, deductive reasoning. 
This is exactly what Professor Lawson used to say. Con-
sider this passage from a 1990 article in part about good formal-
ist methodology: 
Formalism, at least in my hands, is an application of original-
ist textualism to questions of constitutional structure. De-
fined more precisely, formalism consists of a substantive prin-
ciple of interpretation ('Resolve separation of powers 
questions using only the text, structure, and background of 
36. Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994). It is a significant concession on Lawson's part to 
say that there is no comparable clear rule as to the meaning of "the judicial Power." 
Lawson, 18 Canst. Comm. at 202-03 (cited in note 2). If it cannot be said that the Article 
III judicial power entails an autonomous power to prescribe a doctrine of stare decisis, or 
itself provides a rule of stare decisis, a congressional statute abrogating the doctrine is 
simply not analogous to an (unconstitutional) act vesting unreviewable executive power 
in someone other than the President of the United States. 
37. Such a delegation must be to the Article III branch, however. Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361,416-17 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the Constitution, applying late eighteenth-century America as 
the locus of meaning for those interpretative variables') and a 
primary inference ('The vesting clauses divide otherwise unal-
located federal governmental authority into three kinds of 
functions and fully distribute it among three distinct sets of in-
. . ') 38 stitutrons . 
241 
Lawson then proceeded to contrast formalism with functional-
ism, where "the question of blending is treated as one of degree 
rather than, as with formalism, one of kind."39 How far Cro-
Magnon, Formalist Lawson has "evolved" in just a decade to 
Balancer Lawson! Apparently, constant bathing in the pool of 
legal academia has resulted in a certain degree of softening of 
the skin. 
Truth be told, I do not really fear that Lawson has grown 
squishy in his principles. I say these things only to needle and 
provoke my friend, and to make a closing point: True formalist 
principles lead to my conclusion, not Lawson's. The Constitu-
tion simply does not create an autonomous power of judicial pol-
icy-making that authorizes courts to place matters of judicial pol-
icy and administration ahead of decision in accordance with the 
law. And if the Constitution doesn't confer such a power on the 
courts, then it is both proper and necessary for Congress to pass 
a statute telling the courts that they can't just go off and make up 
such a power on their own. 
38. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. 
Rev. 853, 859-60 (1990). 
39. Id. at 860. 
